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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

!

BLANCHE ZOLLINGER MADSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Civil 8151

APPELLANT'S
\ REPLY BRIEF .
J

DELBERT MURRAY MADSEN,
Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from the District Court of the First
Judicial District of the State of Utah
In and for the County of each~

_ _. . .,,,

·~'.....,

S'<-

'>...
• '.

e-1-k

<..j:>
.

~·~~l
-

'

Honorable Lewis Jones, DistriCt J~g:_

.'1

...o .,
U ;r

_·,

./)._
t

~·

·8$¢

ec'0 . . . ,.....

'lJ_,./4 ........

'"' u~~
. '". "

......'<...

L. TOM PERRY
TED' S. PERRY
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
BLANCHE ZOLLINGER MADSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

DELBERT MURRAY MADSEN,
Defendant and Respondent.

Civil 8151

APPELLANT'S
REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT
It will be remembered by the Court that Appellant
had filed her notice of appeal, taken her appeal, designated the record that she desired brought up from the
lower court and presented her brief in this matter, and
that thereafter Woodrow D. White and C. Preston Allen
made a motion that the Court permit Respondent to file
additional record on appeal under certain terms; that
thereafter this additional record was filed.
It will also be remembered Appellant was permitted
to present arguments based on this additional record in
either her reply brief or in a supplemental brief.
In general we think the facts of the case have been
duly presented in Appellant's statement of facts and in
Respondent's statement of facts. But a brief history of
the trial of the action which extended from April27, 1953,
to December 7, 1953, would be helpful to the Court in
determining this matter.
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The trial of the action commenced at 10:00 o'clock
a. m. April 27th, 1953. Appellant introduced her evidence
in support of her complaint. The evidence showed that
Appellant had $1900.00 in cash and bonds at the thne of
her marriage ( AR 3); that defendant and respondent had
land which he had valued at $1500.00 ( AR 5); that the
parties owned a car ( AR 4); that the parties had certain
household furniture ( AR 5, 6); that the defendant was
working ( AR 13); that he had two jobs ( AR 14) with a
take home pay from these two jobs of $280.26 per month
( AR 41, 42, 43); and that he was getting $95.00 per month
from the United States Government for partial disability
( AR 15). That Appellant was not working ( AR 13).
That while the Defendant was being cross-examined
concerning his property at the continuation of the trial of
the case, April 29, 1953, the Court took a recess. That
after the recess the parties with their attorneys met in
chambers and agreed to the following stipulation:
"Mr. Perry: It's stipulated in open court between
the parties and their attorneys and in their presence
that if in any event the court sees fit to grant a
divorce, he may award custody of the children to the
plaintiff, Mrs. Madsen, and as a property and maintenance setttlement, the court may award the plaintiff, Mrs. Madsen, the sum of $1000 payable in six
months; for the maintenance of the children, $30
would be best each, wouldn't it?
"Mr. Sjostrom: It wouldn't make any difference,
I guess.
"Mr. Perry: Thirty dollars each until how long?
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"Mr. Sjostrom: Until further order of the court,
and $150 attorney's fees. When does he commence
paying alimo~y? The property settlement here will
be in lieu of all other rights of the plaintiff, purported rights, in lieu of all alimony and other property settlements.
"'Mr. Perry: The defendant may have the Plymouth automobile.
"Mr. Sjostrom: That's right.
"Mr. Perry: And the plaintiff may have the ...
"Mr. Sjostrom: You mean the defendant may have
the Pontiac automobile.
"Mr. Perry: Yes, the defendant may have the
automobile, and the plaintiff may have the furniture.
'"Mr. Sjostrom: The defendant may have the lands
in Washington County and St. George." (AR 98, 99).
Part of this stipulation was reiterated in the hearing
on the 15th day of July, 1953 (AR 5 to 8).
After this stipulation the Appellant relied thereon
and introduced no further evidence to assist the Court
in determining the amount of alimony and support money
to be paid. The case was then continued until July 15th,
1953 ( R 25) when additional evidence was taken. On
September 28th, 1953 ( R 25) the Court announced that
Plaintiff was entitled to a judgment dissolving the bonds
of matimony between Plaintiff and Defendant. That the
parties should have joint custody of the children; that
plaintiff should have them nine months and defendant
three months out of each year and that the plaintiff was
to be awarded $25.00 per month as support money for
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each child. On October 13th ( R 25) the Court again
took up the matter and said that the Plaintiff should be
given one-half of the real property and household furniture and defendant the car and that this award should be
in lieu of her rights for alimony. That the custody of the
two eldest children should be given to the defendant three
months out of each year provided he made certain showings. On December 7, 1953, the findings and decree
were signed.
As this case was before the Court for approximately
seven months and as testimony was taken at various intervals during that time and as defendant had personally
contacted the Court (AR 2, 4, 7, 8 of hearing of July 15)
we may excuse the Court for not remembering all that
transpired when he finally signed the decree of divorce.
But because the Court, in not remembering all the facts,
erred in making its decision, this error should be corrected
by the Appellate Court who now has a transcript of the
record before it.
POINT I
THE PARTIES STIPULATED THAT PLAINTIFF
SHOULD HAVE $1000 AND THE HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE IN LIEU OF ALIMONY. THE COURT IS
BOUND BY THIS STIPULATION.
It is our contention that the court should be bound
by the stipulation made by the parties. This position finds
support in the following:
"Stipulations made by the parties to a judicial proceeding, or by their attorneys, within the scope of
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their authority, are binding upon those who make
them, and those who they may lawfully represent,
and upon trial and appellate courts." (50 Am. Jur.
p. 610).
A case very similar to the one at bar is Bloom v. Graff
( Md. ) 63 A. 2d 313. In this action the plaintiff operated
a package liquor store. The defendant's taxicab crashed
into the store. The plaintiff sued for damages. During
the course of the trial the attorney for the plaintiff stated
in open court;
"Your Honor please, before putting on my first witness I would like to state that it is stipulated and
agreed between counsel for the parties to this case
that if a verdict is found in favor of the plaintiff it
should be in the amount of $896.09."
No objection was made to this statement by the attorney
for the defendant. After evidence of negligence had been
introduced the Court instructed the jury that they did not
have to bring in a verdict for $896.09. The jury rendered
a verdict for the plaintiff and fixed the damages at $250.00
and an appeal was taken. In modifying the lower court's
decree the appellate court said:
"Often in the trial of cases certain stipulations are
made by counsel in order to save the time of the
Court and the expense and difficulty of producing
witnesses. Where such stipulation is agreed to by
counsel an orderly trial of the case demands that the
parties are bound there by. If the attorney for the
defense did not agree to that stipulation made in
open 'Court before the trial judge, he should have
objected and so advised the court. Silence under
such circumstances amounts to consent. ..
-7-
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"As the liability of the appellees has been determined
by the jury, there is no issue requiring a new trial.
Judgment is therefore entered in this court for plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of $896.09.')
Two Utah cases have discussed this problem. In
Rickenberg v. Capitol Garage, 68 Utah 30, 249 Pac. 121,
the court said: :
"In this connection it should be stated that Respondent's counsel insist that the latter was not _guilty of
driving the car at the time of his arrest, but assert that
the same was driven by a lad about 13 years of age.
They have set forth the evidence upon that subject
and it supports their contention. We remark, a complete answer to the foregoing contention is that it
was stipulated at the hearing in the court below, and
the stipulation appears in the record, that the respondent was convicted of the offense of driving an
automobile while intoxicated. Respondent is bound
by that stipulation and so are we."
In a more recent case, Richlands Irrigation Con1pany
v. Westview Irrigation Company ( 1938) 96 Ut. 403, 80
P. 2d 458, the state engineer had asked for an adjudication
of water rights in Sevier River. There had been a former
decree whereby the upper water users had agreed to permit the waters to flow to lower reservoirs during the
winter time. The Vermillion Irrigation Company did not
agree to this decree so the other parties drew up a stipulation with the Vermillion Company in which it was provided that the Vermillion Company should have 37.80
c.f.s of the waters of the Sevier River accumulating between the Annabella and Vermillion dams, provided that
whenever the water yielded between the two dams would
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not be sufficient to supply the Vermillion Company with
the 37.80 c.f.s., then the rights hereinbefore mentioned
and set out under Section A shall prorate equally with
the said Vermillion Canal Company. The trial court in
interpreting this stipulation restricted the rights of the
Vermillion Company to the waters that arose in the Sevier
River between the two dams. An appeal was taken and
the appellate court reversed the decision of the lower court
giving a different interpretation to the stipulation and
then saying:
"Where parties litigant, instead of assembling witnesses and putting on their proofs, reduce their respective rights and priorities to writing and stipulate
that a decree may be entered in conformity thereto,
such contract if lawful has a binding effect on the
decree that may be entered. It has all the binding
effect of findings of fact and conclusions of law made
by the court upon evidence, and more. A court may
modify its findings in apt time but it cannot change
or modify a contract of the parties. In the particulars
pointed out, the court by its findings, conclusions and
decree varied the provisions not in harmony therewith. The contract of the parties amounted to a
stipulation that all the facts necessary to support
such contract and a decree in conformity thereto
pre-existed and would be sustained by available evidence, had not the agreement of the parties dispensed
with the taking of evidence. . . The agreement in
writing is equal to an express court finding of facts
to support the year-round water rights described
therein."
This is appellant's position in this matter. The parties
having agreed on a fixed sum of $1000 plus the household
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furniture in lieu of alimony and having agreed on $30.00
per month for each child for support and maintenance, the
lower court had no power to modify this agreement and
where the conclusions of law or the decree varied from
the stipulation, they must be set aside and a judgment entered in accordance with the stipulations.
While it may be true that there was some evidence in
the record that the defendant was in poor health and that
he did not always have regular employment and while it
may also be true that there was a lack of evidence that
appellant needed the $1000 and while it may be true that
the property given to her was the equivalent of $1000
(which we deny), the court is not concerned with evidence that found its way into the record which may or
may not support its decision. Such evidence and facts do
not control the decision in this case. The decision should
be based entirely upon the agreement made by the parties
in open court.
POINT II
THE PARTIES LIKEWISE AGREED ON THE
SUM OF $30 PER MONTH FOR THE SUPPORT AND
MAINTENANCE OF EACH CHILD. THE COURT IS
LIKEWISE BOUND BY THIS STIPULATION.
The same rule should hold with respect to the monthly
allowance to plaintiff for the support of her three minor
children, for it is stipulated that this sum should be $30
per month and the court gave only $25 per month for each
child. As this stipulation has not been set aside both
parties should be bound by it. Plaintiff would like to
-10-
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contend that $30 is an insufficient amount, but her hands
are tied by the stipulation. In a like manner, the respondent should be bound.
Respondent further argues that plaintiff should be
bound by the judgment of the court because "there is no
affirmative evidence which would support appellant's
position that a greater sum is necessary for the support and
maintenance of the children" (Respondent's Brief, page
7). We agree to this lack of evidence. When Respondent
stipulated that he would pay to the Plaintiff the sum of
$30 per month for the support of each child, Plaintiff relied
on this stipulation and withheld her evidence as to the
amount necessary for their support. Respondent cannot
now take advantage of plaintiff's position. He led her to
believe that he would pay $30 per month for each child.
He cannot now complain that there is insufficient evidence
to support such an award. His stipulation admitted that
no evidence was necessary to prove the amount of the
award. He cannot now complain.
POINT III
AS THE PARTIES AGREED ON THE CUSTODY
OF THE CHILDREN THERE WAS NO NEED· OF
LEAVING THIS MATTER OPEN FOR FURTHER
HEARING, BUT A JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE
BEEN ENTERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
STIPULATION.
The rights of the custody of the children have likewise been fixed by stipulation and unless tlie stipulation
is against public policy it should be upheld. The trial
-11-
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Court in modify~g the stipulation does not take the view
that the stipulation is against public policy, but it contends that it would be against the interests of the father
to give exclusive custody of the children to the mother.
It is clear from the evidence that the parties agreed that
plaintiff should have custody of the children and during
the three vacation months of June, July, and August the
father should have the right to take the children for a
visit twice each summer for one week each time ( AR 100102).
The record is not clear as to the duration of the visits
during the non-vacation period. Mr. Sjostrom, attorney
for Respondent inquires (AR 101): "And then, say if he
comes up on short visits, would it be okeh with you Mrs.
Madsen, that he take them a day or two out around this
valley, to, say, a show or something like that?" To which
Mrs. Madsen replied "Yes."
As this part of the stipulation is not clear the appelate
court should definitely fix the time and number of such
non-vacation visits.
Plaintiff does not think the father should be given any
privileges of custody of the third child who is ill. This
child should remain with the mother. Plaintiff likewise
contends that frequent custody of the child for forty-eight
hours at a time is detrimental to the interest of the children who attain the age of 36 months. The time is too
long. In fixing the time of the visits the Court should
consider what is best for the child and not what is convenient for the father.
-12-
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We cannot resist respondent's contention that the
father should have visiting privileges for all his children.
But those privileges should be conditioned on his prompt
payment of the amount awarded for the maintenance of
his children and for alimony. If he does not pay, the
visiting privileges should be denied.
CONCLUSION
We think the judgment of the trial court should be
modified to comply with the stipulation of the parties.
The plaintiff should be given $1000 and the household
furniture in _lieu of alimony. The plaintiff should likewise
be awarded the sum of $90 each month for the support
and maintenance of her three children. Plaintiff should
have custody of the children and the decree should be
made final in that it should not contain a provision permitting respondent to seek more liberal terms. The court
should fix the times of defendant's visits. Such visits
should be permitted only when defendant is not delinquent in payment of alimony and support money. These
times should not be more than twice during vacation periods of one week duration each and not more than once
each month for defendant to take his children to a show
or for a ride around Cache Valley. These are the terms
the parties agreed upon and these should be the terms
of the decree.
Respectfully submitted,
PERRY & PERRY
Attorneys for Appellant.
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